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Abstract 
 
This study explores the impact of managerial discretion on the information content of reported 
earnings.  In particular, we extend the prior research by examining the pricing of discretionary 
accruals for firms subject to antitrust merger investigation.  To date, the empirical evidence on 
managerial discretion and earnings informativeness has been limited, and the pricing of 
discretionary accruals in the earnings management context of antitrust merger investigations has 
not been examined.  We address this gap in the literature, and provide results that are consistent 
with our expectations. Specifically, the evidence indicates that investigated firms’ discretionary 
accruals are priced by the stock market, and that such earnings components have incremental 
information content regarding future profitability.  In contrast, as expected, the accruals of non-
investigated firms are not value-relevant.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
he merger wave in the U.S. continued at a rapid pace during the 1990s.  From 1991 to 1999, the 
number of mergers tripled from 1529 to 4642 and the total value of these mergers increased from 
$169 billion to over $1.9 trillion (Parker and Balto 2000).  While less than three percent of mergers 
receive an in-depth investigation by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), a 
large majority of these combining firms face enforcement actions.  The FTC and DOJ use antitrust laws to initiate 
enforcement.  These laws are: Clayton Act of 1914 and 1950, Sherman Act of 1890, Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976, 
and Racketeer Influenced of Corrupt Organization Act of 1970 (Weston et al. 1990).  The primary objective of 
antitrust laws is to preserve fair competition among firms in their respective industries.  
 
 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 is incorporated in the Clayton Act as Section 7a.  It applies to 
acquisitions exceeding $15 million and it requires a 30-day waiting period before merger consummation.  The 
waiting period may be extended by an additional 20 days at the request of either of the regulatory bodies—DOJ or 
FTC.  Before the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the government took remedial measures several years after 
the consummation of the merger.  By that time, it was difficult to establish antitrust violations because of the 
intermingling of assets of acquiring and target firms. Following the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the 
DOJ/FTC performs initial merger investigation during the waiting period.  After the initial investigation firms’ 
responses may include disposal of assets, partial divestiture, and earnings management to affect the final outcome of 
the investigation.  The DOJ/FTC, of course, investigates only those mergers where the agency believes that the 
antitrust laws may have been violated.  This study investigates whether the post-waiting period discretionary accruals 
have value-relevance and whether future profitability can be assessed using these discretionary accruals.  
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
T 
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2.  Background literature 
 
2.1.  Valuation of Discretionary Accruals  
 
 This study explores the impact of discretionary accruals on the information content of reported earnings for  
firms subject to antitrust merger investigation. Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) rely on accounting 
accruals to provide earnings information that is useful in business decision-making (Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, 1978). Such accrual-based earnings information is considered to be useful because the expense is recorded in 
the period of benefit, rather than the period of cash outlay. Prior studies, however, have documented the 
manipulation of accounting accruals, where these discretionary accounting choices occur both within and outside the 
bounds of GAAP (see for example, McNichols and Wilson, 1988). 
 
 The impact of discretionary accruals on the information content of earnings is subject to debate. On the one 
hand, these manipulations could enhance the value-relevance of reported earnings by communicating a manager’s 
private information regarding future profitability (see for example, Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). On the other hand, 
the flexibility inherent in GAAP may result in opportunistic behavior that distorts reported earnings (see for example, 
Healy and Palepu, 1993). To date, empirical research on managerial discretion and earnings informativeness has 
been indirect and mixed, and the information effects of discretionary accruals in particular is relatively unexplored 
(Subramanyam, 1996). 
 
 Guy et al. (1996) and Subramanyam (1996) were among the first to investigate the value-relevance of 
discretionary accruals.  Guay et al. (1996) used market-based tests to investigate whether return-earnings component 
regression coefficients are consistent with their research hypotheses—firm performance, opportunism, noise.  
Subramanyam (1996) sampled more than 2800 firms over the 1973-1993 period and reports that discretionary 
accrual manipulations improve the ability of earnings to reflect the firm’s economic value, and thus are priced by an 
efficient market.  Subramanyam (1996) emphasizes, however, that his study is limited to discretionary accruals on 
average, and should not be used to draw inferences regarding opportunistic earnings management.  He suggests that 
future studies sample firms with specific manipulation incentives. 
 
 Responding to Subramanyam’s (1996) suggestion for a more carefully selected sample, this study 
contributes to the literature on discretionary accrual pricing by examining the earnings management efforts of firms 
subject to investigation for antitrust merger violations. To the extent that the discretionary accruals of investigated 
firms signal a manager’s private information regarding the costs of antitrust interference, these manipulations will 
enhance the value- relevance of reported earnings. In examining the pricing of investigated firms’ discretionary 
accruals, we also answer recent calls for research on the response of investors to earnings management for antitrust 
purposes (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).   Our study is different from Subramanyam (1996) and Guay et al. (1996) with 
respect to the incentive for earnings management.  These studies use aggregate relation between stock returns, 
discretionary accruals, and non-discretionary earnings.  We focus on a specific sample where the incentive for 
earnings management is clearly present. 
 
2.2.  Political Costs and Antitrust Merger Investigations 
 
 In its traditional form, the political cost hypothesis predicts that large firms are subject to greater political 
scrutiny, and thus will be more likely to use discretionary accounting choices to reduce reported earnings (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978).  Firm size, however, is a noisy proxy for these government imposed wealth transfers or political 
costs (Ball and Foster, 1982). Accordingly, more recent research has refined political cost analyses by focusing on 
specific, government imposed wealth transfers (see for example, trade relief wealth transfers in Jones, 1991and cable 
industry deregulation in Key 1997).
1
  In particular, discretionary accruals are more prevalent in earnings 
management settings where political costs are large and are causally linked to reported profits (Cahan, 1992). One 
such setting is antitrust merger investigations. 
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 Antitrust merger policy in the United States is enforced by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Antitrust regulators use reported earnings in 
discerning the competitive impact of a merger (Elzinga, 1989; Baker and Bresnahan, 1992).
2
  Moreover, the costs of 
such regulatory interference to the merging firms are large.  For example, Coate et al. (1995) reported that firms 
settle their Section 7 cases with antitrust regulators in order to reduce the opportunity costs of delayed merger gains. 
Other costs associated with antitrust investigations include executive time, legal expenses, penalties, interruptions in 
productive activity, and direct loss of merger gains due to cancellation of the merger or divestiture of the acquired or 
existing assets (see for example, Eckbo and Wier, 1985).  
 
 Given the magnitude of merger-related political costs and the linkage to profits, investigated firms have a 
strong incentive to use discretionary accruals to reduce their reported earnings and political costs. To the extent that 
such accrual manipulations communicate private information regarding the costs of antitrust investigations, the value 
relevance of reported earnings may be enhanced. Thus, our tests of discretionary accruals consider (1) whether the 
market prices such manipulations and (2) whether the discretionary accrual component of earnings has incremental 
information content regarding future profitability. The formal hypotheses pertaining to these tests are detailed next. 
 
3.  Research Method 
 
3.1.  Hypotheses formulation 
 
 In this study, we assume that managers of firms investigated for merger-related antitrust violations are apt to 
prefer accrual manipulations to accounting method changes in attempting to reduce their reported earnings and 
political costs.  Like prior studies (see for example, Cahan, 1992), we argue that such preferences reflect the relative 
availability and subtlety of discretionary accruals.  Moreover, accruals represent a summary measure of numerous 
accounting method changes and thus provide a more complete test of discretionary accounting choices (Healy, 1985; 
Balsam, 1998).  
 
 As discussed above, firms subject to investigation for antitrust merger violations have incentive to 
manipulate accounting accruals. Given the nature of this earnings management context, recent studies argue that such 
political cost incentives for manipulating accruals extend beyond the initial investigation outcome (Makar and Alam, 
1998). In particular, antitrust observers have noted that firms often agree to costly settlements with the DOJ or the 
FTC in order to expedite the merger, and then deal with alleged antitrust violations later. Coate et al. (1995), for 
example, observed that investigated firms agree to dispose of contested assets regardless of the underlying legal 
merits of the regulator’s terms. Such asset dispositions impose substantial costs on settling firms, which extend 
beyond the initial investigation (Eckbo and Wier, 1985). Other case settlements that increase firms’ post-
investigation political costs include regulatory restrictions on future sales in certain markets and regulatory decrees 
which prohibit future mergers or require regulatory permission for such acquisitions (Wier, 1983). This study 
focuses on the information content associated with these post-investigation costs of antitrust merger action. 
 
 In dealing with the alleged antitrust violations, investigated firms have incentive to manipulate accruals in 
order to influence the regulator’s subsequent discernment of anticompetitive behavior (Makar and Alam, 1998). 
Prompted by the substantial economic constraints of divestiture settlements and other post-investigation political 
costs, firms may introduce income-decreasing discretionary accruals as evidence of the associated economic 
hardship in subsequent appeals or other ex post regulatory actions.
3
 We argue that these accrual manipulations may 
enhance the value relevance of reported earnings by communicating manager’s private information regarding the 
post-investigation costs of antitrust interference. 
 
 In light of the post-investigation incentives to manipulate accruals and the accompanying information 
effects, we define the event period as the year following the initial investigation outcome. As introduced above, our 
first hypothesis predicts that the discretionary accruals of investigated firms will be priced by the stock market.  This 
hypothesis is consistent with the literature that argues that accruals are predictor of future earnings and that accruals 
are priced in equity valuation (Barth et al. 1999).  To the extent that discretionary accruals have incremental 
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information content beyond that of other earnings components, the relationship between these manipulations and the 
changes in firm value will be significant and positive. Moreover, we expect the relationship between investigated 
firms’ discretionary accruals and the future earnings to be significant and positive, if such accruals signal private 
information regarding the post-investigation costs of antitrust interference with the merger. Accordingly, the formal 
hypotheses (in alternative form) are: 
 
H1a: The discretionary accruals of investigated firms during the event year are positively associated with 
contemporaneous changes in firm value. 
 
H2a: The discretionary accruals of investigated firms during the event year are positively associated with future 
profitability subsequent to the event period. 
 
 Figure 1 illustrates the event period in relation to these two hypotheses. 
 
  
Figure 1 
The Event Period 
 
The event period is the year following the initial investigation outcome. Hypothesis one (H1) considers the pricing of 
discretionary accruals during the event year, while hypothesis two (H2) addresses the relation between such event period 
manipulations and future profitability. 
 
Initial antitrust investigation ends  End of event year 
 
 
 Time 
Event period (H1, H2) Future profitability (H2) 
  
 
 
3.2.  Sample and Data 
 
 The initial sample was drawn from the population of firms investigated for antitrust merger violations under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act over the 1973-1992 period.  We identified our sample firms using the Commerce 
Clearing House’s Trade Cases and the Trade Regulation Reporter as well as information obtained directly from the 
DOJ and the FTC.  Because the event year is the year following the initial case outcome, the sample period begins in 
1974 (i.e., the earliest sample observation is a firm whose case ended in 1973).  To be included in the final sample, 
firms were required to appear on Standard and Poor’s Compustat database and operate in either the mining or 
manufacturing sectors (i.e., within the 1000 to 3999 SIC Code range).
4
  The final sample consists of 123 investigated 
firms, with 71 of these firms settling their case with either the DOJ or the FTC.  The remaining 52 investigated firms 
litigated their case to conclusion. As discussed above, case settlements usually involve divestitures that impose 
substantial costs on investigated firms.  Consistent with this observation, more than 83 percent of the 71 settling 
firms agreed to partial or full divestitures.   
 
 Given the enhanced manipulation incentives and accompanying information effects for settling firms, the 
results presented below detail both the total sample of 123 investigated firms and the sub-sample of 71 settling firms. 
 Table 1 list the sample firms by year and the number of DOJ investigations initiated in that year obtained from Gallo 
et al. (2000).  The table shows that our sample, which contains both FTC and DOJ investigated firms, is about one-
fifth the size of all DOJ investigated firms reported by Gallo et al. (2000).  Admittedly, the DOJ investigations 
provide only a partial coverage of the antitrust enforcement activities.  However, their investigative role is an 
important component of the U.S. antitrust law enforcement. 
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 In light of the traditional assumption 
that large firms face higher political costs and 
thus have greater incentive to reduce reported 
earnings, we select a control sample of non-
investigated firms matched to investigated 
firms’ total assets in the period prior to the 
event year.
5
  This size-matched control sample 
was drawn from the Manufacturing Sector 
Master File developed by Hall (1989). The 
Manufacturing Sector Master File was created 
at the National Bureau of Economic Research 
and contains approximately 1200 firms that 
exited Compustat due to mergers or other 
changes in corporate form. 
 
 Table 2 provides event period 
descriptive statistics about the variables of 
interest for both the experimental sample of 
investigated firms and the size-matched control 
sample of non-investigated firms. Total accruals 
for both samples, defined as the change in 
specific working capital accounts (i.e., accounts 
receivable, inventory, accounts payable, and 
income taxes payable) less depreciation and 
deferred tax expenses (see for example, Healy, 
1985), are negative on average (i.e., income 
decreasing) due to depreciation expense. 
Similarly, both discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals (calculated using 
equation 2 detailed below) are negative on 
average for all samples. Looking at the settling 
firm sub-sample in particular, the discretionary 
accruals are significantly income decreasing (at 
a .05 one-sided level), consistent with earnings 
management expectations. This study focuses 
on the information content of such 
manipulations, using the models detailed next. 
 
3.3.  Research Models 
 
 Like recent empirical studies (see for example, DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994), discretionary accruals are 
proxied using the ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients from the following model that is estimated for each two-
digit SIC Code and non-investigation year (excluding the event year) over the 1974-1992 sample period.
6,7
  
 
 TAAjt  = j  + 1j ChgREVAjt + 2j PPEAjt + jt (1) 
 
where 
 TAAjt is the total accruals (computed using Compustat data item #2 for accounts receivable, #3 for 
inventory, #70 for accounts payable, #71 for income taxes payable, #14 for depreciation expense, and #50 
for deferred tax expense) of firms in industry j for year t. 
 ChgREVAjt is the revenues (Compustat data item #12) in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firms in 
industry j. 
 PPEAjt is the gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat data item #7) of firms in industry j for year t. 
Table 1 
Sample firms and firms investigated by DOJ 
 
Year Sample Investigations DOJ Investigations 
   
1973 1 39 
1974 4 34 
1975 9 32 
1976 13 38 
1977 6 29 
1978 7 34 
1979 13 28 
1980 6 42 
1981 15 16 
1982 5 24 
1983 7 25 
1984 6 20 
1985 4 17 
1986 3 14 
1987 7 17 
1988 5 20 
1989 1 15 
1990 5 29 
1991 4 26 
1992 2 25 
 123 524 
DOJ investigations are the number of firms investigated by the 
Department of Justice and reported by Gallo et al. (2000).  The 
sample firms contain those only firms which were investigated for 
merger-related antitrust investigation under Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act whereas the DOJ investigated firms includes all DOJ 
antitrust cases reported by Gallo et al. (2000). 
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 Equation (1) is based on Jones (1991) and models the non-discretionary component of total accruals. All 
variables in the model are deflated by the total assets variable in order to reduce heteroscedasticity.
8
  Discretionary 
accruals are proxied using the prediction errors (DACjp) calculated in equation (2), based on coefficients from OLS 
estimates of equation (1). 
 
 DACjp = TAAjp - (a + b1 ChgREVAjp + b2 PPEAjp) (2) 
 
where p is a year index for years included in the event period.  Non-discretionary accruals are represented by the 
term in parenthesis. Thus, equation (2) calculates the difference between actual accruals (TAA) and an estimate of 
what accruals should be in the absence of earnings management (i.e., non-discretionary accruals), for each 
investigated firm operating in two-digit SIC Code j. 
 
 In testing the first hypothesis that discretionary accruals are priced by the stock market, equation (3) 
examines the correlation between cumulative changes in firm value and the components of earnings, similar to 
Subramanyam  (1996). 
 
 CUMRETjp =   +1 OCFjp + 2 NDACjp + 3 DACjp +  (3) 
 
where 
 CUMRETjp is the cumulative stock returns (using monthly returns from CRSP database) over a twelve-
month period for firms in industry j, ending three months after the fiscal year end of event period p. 
 OCFjp is the operating cash flows (Compustat data item #308) of firms in industry j for event period p. 
 NDACjp is the non-discretionary accruals (computed using equation 2) of firms in industry j for event 
period p. 
 DACjp is the discretionary accruals (computed using equation 2) of firms in industry j for event period p. 
 
 With reference to the first hypothesis that the event-period discretionary accruals of investigated firms are 
positively associated with contemporaneous changes in firm value, it is anticipated that the estimated coefficient on 
the DAC variable will be statistically significant and positive for the investigated firms, but not for the size-matched 
control sample of non-investigated firms. 
 
 As Subramanyam (1996) emphasizes, the pricing of discretionary accruals is consistent with two alternative 
market conditions: (1) market efficiency, if such accruals communicate a manager’s private information regarding 
future profitability; or (2) market inefficiency, if discretionary accruals create distortions in the earnings information. 
These two alternative conditions are distinguished in our second hypothesis that considers whether investigated 
firms’ discretionary accruals signal private information regarding the future costs of antitrust interference with the 
merger.  
 
 Similar to Subramanyam (1996), we address this second hypothesis both directly, by examining the 
association between investigated firms’ discretionary accruals and future earnings in equation (4), and indirectly, by 
examining the association between such accruals and changes in dividends in equation (5). With reference to the 
second hypothesis that investigated firms’ event-period discretionary accruals are positively associated with future 
profitability, it is anticipated that the estimated coefficient on the DAC variable will be statistically significant and 
positive in both analyses. 
 
 EARNINGSj, p+i =   + 1 OCFjp + 2 NDACjp + 3 DACjp +  (4) 
 
where EARNINGSj,p+i is the future earnings measure (using three alternative measures defined below) of firms in 
industry j for periods p+i (i = 1 or 2 years ahead of event period p). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
 Mean Std. Dev. Median Maximum Minimum % 
  
Panel A: Investigated Firms 
Total accruals -0.038a 0.061 -0.037 0.151 -0.214 23 
Discretionary accruals 
 Total sample -0.017 0.240 -0.002 1.318 -1.142 46 
 Settling firm sub-sample -0.015b 0.056 -0.002 0.070 -0.241 47 
Non-discretionary accruals -0.017  0.228 -0.028 1.013 -1.330 30 
Non-discretionary income  0.085a 0.248 0.072 1.209 -1.310 86 
Net income  0.062a 0.046 0.064 0.178 -0.122 92 
Operating cash flows  0.103a 0.072 0.100 0.306 -0.060 94 
Returns  0.215a 0.286 0.199 0.827 -0.475 79 
  
  
Panel B: Non-investigated Firms 
Total accruals -0.033a 0.075 -0.027 0.179 -0.394 24 
Discretionary accruals -0.009  0.086 -0.003 0.164 -0.586 47 
Non-discretionary accruals -0.024a 0.093 -0.025 0.518 -0.449 31 
Non-discretionary income  0.065a 0.102 0.064 0.663 -0.229 85 
Net income  0.052a 0.056 0.054 0.216 -0.236 90 
Operating cash flows  0.088a 0.088 0.092 0.447 -0.211 91 
Returns  0.235a 0.301 0.234 0.968 -0.454 81 
   
Event period descriptive statistics are calculated for variables used in tests of hypotheses, as detailed in Tables 3-5. All variables 
except cumulative returns (Returns) are deflated by total assets, where the experimental sample of investigated firms (Total 
sample) includes firms who settled their case with antitrust regulators (Settling firm sub-sample). 
a significant at the one-sided .01 level 
b  significant  at the one-sided .05 level 
 
 
 The explanatory variables in equation (4) are the same as those defined in relation to equation (3).  The 
three alternative measures of future earnings are: nondiscretionary income (using operating cash flows from 
Compustat data item #308 plus nondiscretionary accruals from equation 2), net income (using Compustat data item 
#18), and operating cash flows (using Compustat data item #308).
.9 
 
 In contrast to equation (4), the logit model depicted in equation (5) is a less direct test of the second 
hypothesis. Specifically, the inherent assumption underlying equation (5) is that managers of investigated firms use 
dividend changes to signal private information regarding firm value (Subramanyam, 1996). 
 
 CDIVj, p+i =  1 OCFjp + 2 NDACjp + 3 DACjp +      (5) 
 
where CDIVj, p+i is the dividend change measure (using two alternative measures defined below) of firms in industry j 
for periods p+i (i = 0 or 1 year ahead of event period p). 
 
 Similar to Subramanyam (1996), the two alternative measures of the dependent variable are: (1) CDIV1 
which equals 1 if the annual dividend change is positive (else, indicator variable is 0) and (2) CDIV2 which equals 1 
if the annual dividend change is positive (else, indicator variable is 0 if change is negative).  The explanatory 
variables in equation (5) are the same as those defined in equations (3) and (4). 
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4.  Results 
 
4.1.  Discretionary accruals and stock returns 
 
 Turning to the first hypothesis that the event-period discretionary accruals of investigated firms will be 
priced in the market, Panel A of Table 3 presents the OLS estimation results for the full model depicted in equation 
(3).
10
 The model is statistically significant (at a .01 level) for the investigated firms.  Likewise, all three estimated 
coefficients are significant (at a .05, two-sided level), indicating that each of these three components of reported 
earnings has incremental information content.  Consistent with alternative hypothesis one, the estimated coefficient 
on the DAC variable indicates that there is a significant and positive association between investigated firms’ 
discretionary accruals during the event period and cumulative contemporaneous changes in firm value.  In contrast, 
the results for the non-investigated control firms are not significant (at a .05 level), as expected. 
 
4.2.  Sensitivity tests 
 
 We employ the Jones (1991) model to test hypothesis one.  While this model has been used extensively in 
the contemporary earnings management literature, it is based on the assumption that the non-discretionary 
component of accruals is correctly identified. In light of this assumption, we provide sensitivity tests to consider the 
robustness of our results to measurement error. Following recent studies (see for example, Guay et al., 1996), we use 
the modified Jones model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) to examine the sensitivity of Table 3 results to revenue 
manipulations.  Like the results of prior studies (see for example, Holthausen et al., 1995; Hall and Stammerjohn, 
1997; Key, 1997), our Table 3 results are consistent regardless of the approach taken to estimating discretionary 
accruals. We also examine the robustness of our results to extreme financial performance, using earnings and cash 
flow measures (see for example, Dechow et al., 1995). Neither variable is statistically significant (at a .05 level) 
across the experimental and size-matched control samples. Thus, the firms investigated for antitrust merger 
violations are not statistically different from the control sample of non-investigated firms in terms of firm 
performance. See Beneish (1997) for additional discussion of earnings management and extreme financial 
performance. 
 
 To further examine the value relevance of discretionary accruals, Panel B of Table 3 details the OLS 
estimation results pertaining to equation (3) after omitting the DAC variable. Focusing on these reduced-model 
results for investigated firms, the adjusted R
2
 declines to 5.6%, compared to the 10.2% adjusted R
2
 in the full model. 
As indicated by the Vuong statistic in Panel C, this 4.6% incremental R
2
 is statistically significant (at a .01 level). 
Thus, the full model is significantly better than the reduced model in explaining variations in firm value.
11
  In sum, 
Table 3 results indicate that investigated firms’ discretionary accruals are priced by the market during the event 
period and have incremental information content beyond the other components of earnings. Whether such 
information content pertains to the post-event period earnings is considered in the next section. 
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Table 3 
Cross-sectional Regression Results of Returns and Event Period Earnings Components: Tests of Hypothesis One 
 
                                         Estimated Coefficients (t-statistics) 
 n AdjR2% Intercept  OCF NDAC DAC F-stat   
Panel A: Full Model 
Investigated firms 74 10.2 0.026  (0.392) 2.415a (3.217) 1.816b (1.998) 1.859b (2.088) 3.676a 
Non-investigated firms 52 -2.8 0.253a (3.657) -0.088 (-0.117) 0.769  (0.685) 0.188 (0.173) 0.534 
   
Panel B: Reduced Model 
Investigated firms 74 5.6 0.093  (1.641) 1.149b (2.498) -0.019 (-0.090)  3.154a 
Non-investigated firms 52 -.8 0.254a (3.715) -0.152 (-0.235) 0.594  (1.247)  0.802 
   
Panel C: Full vs. Reduced Model 
Incremental R2% (Vuong statistic) 
Investigated firms   4.6a (2.049)  
  
Hypothesis one is tested using cross-sectional estimates of the model expressed in equation (3), for the total sample of investigated firms. 
 
CUMRETjp =   + 1 OCFjp + 2 NDACjp + 3 DACjp +       
 
Where 
 CUMRETjp is cumulative returns over 12 month period for firms in industry j, ending 3 months after fiscal year end of event period p. 
 OCFjp is operating cash flows of firms in industry j for event period p. 
 NDACjp is non-discretionary accruals of firms in industry j for event period p. 
 DACjp is discretionary accruals of firms in industry j for event period p. 
 
a  significant  at the two-sided .01 level 
b  significant  at the two-sided .05 level 
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4.3.  Discretionary accruals and future profitability  
 
 With regard to the second hypothesis, that the event-period discretionary accruals of investigated firms 
provide information about future profitability subsequent to the event period, Table 4 details the OLS estimation 
results for the future earnings model depicted in equation (4).
12
  To promote comparisons to Tables 2 and 3, the 
estimation results are presented for both the total sample and the sub-sample of settling firms. Focusing first on the 
total sample’s one-year-ahead results in Table 4, Panel A, there is some evidence that discretionary accruals 
communicate private information regarding future earnings, when such earnings are measured using net income 
(DAC coefficient of 0.491, significant at a .01, two-sided level).  
 
 Moving to the settling firm sub-sample in Table 4, Panel A, all three measures of future earnings (non-
discretionary income, net income, and operating cash flows) are positively associated with discretionary accruals, as 
expected.  Similar to Sloan (1996), the coefficients of operating cash flows (OCF) suggest that earnings performance 
attributable to the accrual component of earnings is less persistent than earnings performance attributable to the cash 
flow component of earnings.  Recall that the settling firm sub-sample is dominated by costly divestitures and thus 
have enhanced manipulation incentives and accompanying information effects. Consistent with alternative hypothesis 
two, settling firm’s discretionary accruals are informative regarding future earnings regardless of the measure of 
future earnings used:  non-discretionary income (DAC coefficient = 1.176, significant at a .01, two-sided level), net 
income (DAC coefficient = 1.247, significant at a .01, two-sided level), or operating cash flows (DAC coefficient = 
0.871, significant at a .05, two-sided level).  Finally, the Vuong statistics (significant at .01, one-sided level) indicate 
that the inclusion of settling firms’ discretionary accruals significantly improves the explanatory power of the future 
earnings models in all cases.  
 
 In sum, Table 4, Panel A results suggest that discretionary accruals have incremental information content 
regarding future earnings, especially for the settling firm sub-sample which is dominated by costly divestitures. In 
contrast, the results detailed in Table 4, Panel B are mostly insignificant (1996). We conjecture that the insignificant 
two-year-ahead results are due to the short-term nature of accrual manipulations. Prior studies report that working 
capital accruals are more susceptible to manipulation (see for example, Kreutzfeldt and Wallace, 1986), where such 
discretionary accruals pertain to short-term earnings. 
 
 Table 5 presents the logit estimation results for the dividend change model depicted in equation (5).
13
 
Assuming signaling theory correctly predicts that managers will use changes in dividends to signal future 
profitability, then information-relevant discretionary accruals should be correlated with such dividend changes. In 
particular, a positive association between dividend changes and discretionary accruals suggests that the latter 
accounting information improves the ability of earnings to reflect future profitability.  
 
 Turning to Panel A of Table 5, the one-year-ahead results for settling firms are consistent with expectations. 
Specifically, the estimated coefficients on the DAC variable are positive and significant (at a .05 two-sided level) for 
both measures of dividend changes (i.e., CDIV1 and CDIV2).  While these results are less direct than the future 
earnings analyses in Table 4, they do offer additional corroborating evidence.  The current-year results presented in 
Table 5, Panel B are also significant (at 0.05 two-sided level) for settling firms, using CDIV1 as the dependent 
variable.  However, the DAC variable is not significant for CDIV2 using current year data.   
 
 All together, the results presented in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the discretionary accruals of investigated 
firms provide information regarding future profitability.  Managers use such accruals to communicate private 
information regarding the post-investigation costs of antitrust investigations of mergers.  In this way, discretionary 
accruals improve the informativeness of earnings for our sample. 
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Table 4 
Cross-sectional Regression Results of Future Earnings and Event Period Earnings Components: Tests of Hypothesis Two  
                                        Estimated Coefficients (t-statistics)                                   Incr. R2 % 
n    Adj. R2% Intercept  OCF NDAC DAC                (Vuong stat.)  
Panel A: One-year Ahead 
Non-discretionary income 
Total sample 84 43.9 0.049a (4.271) 0.219  (1.580) 0.734a (4.279) 0.182  (1.037) -.2a (-77.470) 
Settling firm sub-sample 59 27.3 -0.050 (-1.933) 1.336a (4.936) 0.904b (2.651) 1.176a (3.115) 11.2a(24.985) 
 
Net income 
Total sample 84 29.8 0.015b  (2.060) 0.554a (6.153) 0.493a (4.424) 0.491a (4.302) 14.6a (95.237) 
Settling firm sub-sample 59 45.1 -0.049a (-2.854) 1.317a (7.163) 0.952a (4.093) 1.247a (4.835) 21.3a (32.344) 
 
Operating cash flows 
Total sample 84 9.6 0.051a (3.872) 0.407b (2.580) 0.147 (0.753) 0.252  (1.261) .5a   (29.654) 
Settling firm sub-sample 59 24.6 -0.021 (-0.867) 1.162a (4.497) 0.573 (1.760) 0.871b (2.417) 6.3a (20.871)  
Panel B: Two-year Ahead 
Non-discretionary income 
Total sample 75 46.1 0.082a (5.111) -0.006 (-0.035) 0.714a   (3.016) -0.011 (-0.045) -.7a       (-9.047) 
Settling firm sub-sample 50 29.0 0.009  (0.317) 0.288  (0.954) -1.224a (-3.143) -0.114 (-0.266) -1.0a (-10.795) 
 
Net income 
Total sample 75 7.7 0.031a (3.468) 0.290a (2.705) 0.240   (1.819) 0.184  (1.369) 1.1a      (5.178) 
Settling firm sub-sample 50 21.8 0.034a (3.269) 0.081  (0.757) -0.329b (-2.356) -0.273 (-1.783) 13.6a (14.373) 
 
Operating cash flows 
Total sample 75 -.6 0.098a (7.130) 0.091 (0.561) 0.023  (0.114) -0.072 (-0.351) 1.1a (24.852) 
Settling firm sub-sample 50 3.0  0.094a (4.923) 0.031 (0.158) -0.340 (-1.331) -0.316 (-1.133) .8a   (20.509)  
 
Hypothesis two is tested using cross-sectional estimates of the model expressed in equation (4) for both the total sample of investigated firms and the sub-sample of investigated 
firms settling their case with antitrust regulators. See Table 3 for definition of explanatory variables. All models are significant at a .01 level (F-test). The Vuong statistic pertains 
to the full model expressed in equation (4) versus equation (4) after omitting the DAC variable, where a positive (negative) incremental R2 indicates an increase (decrease) in 
explanatory power using the full model. 
 
EARNINGSj, p+i =   + 1 OCFjp + 2 NDACjp + 3 DACjp +  
 
where  EARNINGSj, p+i is the future earnings measure of firms in industry j for periods p+i (i = 1 or 2 years ahead of event period p). 
 
a significant  at the two-sided .01 level 
b significant  at the two-sided .05 level 
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Table 5 
Cross-sectional Regression Results of Dividend Changes and Event Period Earnings Components: Tests of Hypotheses Two  
                                        Estimated Coefficients (t-statistics)                    
      Pearson                    Log 
n Chi-squared Intercept OCF NDAC DAC likelihood  
Panel A: One-year Ahead 
CDIV1 
Total sample 89 87.127a        -1.115b (-2.343) 8.625   (1.530)  9.276 (1.357) 10.135 (1.492) 2.878 
Settling firm sub-sample 63 59.797a        -2.022a (-2.726) 19.284b (2.325) 14.165 (1.620) 21.368b (1.988) 7.399 
 
CDIV2 
Total sample 48 43.948a        -1.169 (-1.297) 30.718b (2.356) 25.523b (2.048) 19.222  (1.592) 8.275  
Settling firm sub-sample 41 35.884a        -3.536b (2.506) 47.514a (2.741) 19.732  (1.465) 48.612b (2.519) 13.978 
  
 
Panel B: Current Year 
CDIV1 
Total sample 89 89.031a        -0.430 (-1.001) 4.064  (0.788) 4.243  (0.668) 4.206  (0.673) 0.636 
Settling firm sub-sample 63 61.589a        -1.027 (-1.651) 12.383 (1.766) 10.660 (1.363)   18.090b (1.918) 4.843 
 
CDIV2 
Total sample 59 59.829a        0.005  (0.007) 18.418 (1.880) 23.487b (2.091) 9.499  (0.844) 8.986 
Settling firm sub-sample 46 44.177a        -1.173 (-1.228) 21.267 (1.867) 14.023  (1.231) 21.796 (1.484) 4.282 
 
 
Hypothesis two is tested using cross-sectional estimates of the model expressed in equation (5) for both the total sample of investigated firms and the sub-sample of investigated 
firms settling their case with antitrust regulators. See Table 3 for definition of explanatory variables. All models are significant at a .01 level (F-test). 
 
CDIVj, p+i =   + 1 OCFjp + 2 NDACjp + 3 DACjp +  
 
where CDIVj, p+i is the dividend change measure (CDIV1 or CDIV2) of firms in industry j for periods p+i (i = 0 or 1 year ahead of event period p), where CDIV1 equals 1 if 
dividend change is positive (or 0, otherwise), and CDIV2 equals 1 if dividend change is positive (or 0, if change is negative). 
 
a significant at the two-sided .01 level 
b significant at the two-sided .05 level 
The Journal of Applied Business Research Volume 19, Number 1 
 69 
5.  Summary and conclusions 
 
 Peltzman (2001) argues that the antitrust law enforcement has declined in the more recent periods.  
However, the results of Gallo et al. (2000) show that the antitrust enforcement has been fairly consistent over the last 
fifty years.  These studies and the ongoing Microsoft case suggests that antitrust investigations remain a dominant 
issue in the American business.  We investigate an unaddressed issue of the effect of discretionary accounting 
choices on the information content of reported earnings for firms subject to antitrust merger investigations. To the 
extent that discretionary accruals signal a manager’s private information regarding the future costs of antitrust 
interference, such accounting choices will enhance the value relevance of GAAP-based reported earnings. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that the stock market attaches value to the discretionary accruals of firms investigated 
for antitrust merger violations, and that such earnings components have incremental information content regarding 
future profitability. Empirically, little is known about the effect of discretionary accruals on earnings 
informativeness. 
 
 The results support our hypotheses, indicating that discretionary accruals are priced and provide 
information about future profitability. By examining the pricing of discretionary accruals in the context of merger-
related antitrust investigations, we provide evidence, which suggests that such market valuations pertain to 
discretionary accruals that improve the informativeness of reported earnings. In this way, we contribute to the 
ongoing debate on the uniformity versus flexibility’ in GAAP. Accounting policy makers, for example, may find our 
study useful in evaluating the costs versus benefits of managerial discretion permitted in current GAAP. The U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission in particular, is currently crusading against what it sees as abusive earnings 
management practices that erode the quality of reported earnings (see for example, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, 
1998). 
 
6.  Suggestions for future research 
 
 Our study shows that discretionary accruals for firms under antitrust investigations are value-relevant to the 
capital markets.  On the other hand, the discretionary accruals of control firms are not significant and therefore are 
not priced by the market.  Future research studies should examine whether financial analysts use discretionary 
accruals in making earnings prediction.  For example, it would be interesting to test whether financial analysts view 
the earnings of investigated versus non-investigated firms differently and that such differences are explained by the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals.   
 
____________________ 
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Endnotes 
 
1 
Key (1997) investigated unexpected accruals of firms in the cable television industry during the period the 
U.S. congress was considering deregulation of the industry.  She found that firms in the industry postponed 
earnings during the period of Congressional investigation. 
 
2 While the use of profits in assessing a merger’s competitive impact is imperfect, the DOJ and the FTC 
endure such imprecision given their objective of prohibiting the creation or reinforcement of 
anticompetitive arrangements (Areeda, 1998). Previous studies support the use of profits in antitrust 
investigations with reference to the positive correlation between profits and market concentration (see for 
example, Weiss, 1974). As a recent example, the 1996 proposed merger of Pacificare and FHP International 
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raised concerns that the increased level of market concentration would allow the combined firm to increase 
profits without any fear of competition  (Gruely and Rundle, 1996). 
 
3 
In contrast to such post-investigation manipulations, reducing earnings prior to this initial outcome may 
work against firms’ efforts to expedite the merger. For example, income-decreasing discretionary accruals 
may hinder the firm’s ability to finance the merger (see for example, Erickson and Wang, 1999). With 
regard to the economic hardship associated with antitrust settlements, Eckbo and Wier (1985) provide 
evidence of the substantial costs borne by settling firms, due in part to the lost merger gains from 
divestitures. See Hall and Stammerjohan (1997) for additional discussion of using a defendant’s financial 
condition as evidence of economic hardship in appeals of initial damage awards. Investigated firms are also 
subject to ex-post settling up by antitrust regulators and/or the courts. Under the Tunney Act, the courts may 
reject an antitrust settlement that does not reasonably advance the public’s interests. See Johnson and 
Parkman (1991) regarding the significant importance that antitrust regulators place on post-acquisition 
evidence of anticompetitive behavior. 
4 
The final sample excludes 15 firms operating in the non-mining or non-manufacturing sectors (i.e., outside 
the 1000-3999 SIC Code range) to control for the extraneous influence of industry specific characteristics. 
For example, prior studies note the unique accounting choice incentives facing financial institutions (Moyer, 
1990). 
5 
Using total assets as a measure of firm size, the matched control sample includes: 53 firms matched at the 
million dollar level, 30 firms matched at the tens-of-million dollar level, 21 firms matched at the hundreds-
of-million dollar level, and 15 firms matched at the billion dollar level. Employing this sample selection 
procedure, 4 of the 123 investigated firms in the experimental sample were unmatched. Thus, the size-
matched control sample consists of 119 non-investigated firms. 
6 
This cross-sectional version of the Jones (1991) model offers a number of advantages over a time series 
approach, including increased sample size, decreased chance of model misspecification, and increased 
power (Subramanyam, 1996). For additional discussion of the cross-sectional Jones model, see DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994). 
7 
The Jones (1991) model has been used extensively in the contemporary earnings management literature, and 
is based on the assumption that the non-discretionary component of accruals is correctly identified.  The 
ability of the Jones (1991) model and other accrual models to partition accruals into discretionary and non-
discretionary components are still questionable.  However, given the current state of knowledge there is no 
better model than the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). In light of this assumption, we provide 
sensitivity tests to consider the robustness of our results to measurement error.  
8 
In cross-sectional estimates of equation (1), industries with fewer than six observations were omitted due to 
OLS requirements (see for example, Subramanyam, 1996). Sample size is discussed further in endnotes 10, 
12 and 13. With regard to model assessment issues, diagnostics used to assess OLS error-term assumptions 
included: residual plots, normal probability plots, White tests for heteroscedasticity, Shapiro-Wilk tests for 
nonnormality, and Durbin-Watson tests for autocorrelation. In addition, diagnostics available from the 
INFLUENCE option in the SAS regression procedure were used in identifying outliers.  Referring to these 
latter diagnostics, nine experimental and size-matched control sample firm-year observations were deemed 
to be outliers with fundamentally different economic characteristics, and thus were omitted from all 
analyses.  
9 
Sloan (1996) argues that total accruals possess less predictive ability with respect to future profitability 
because of a higher degree of subjectivity resulting from managerial discretion and large one-time 
adjustments. 
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10 
The results presented in Table 3 pertain to all firms that appear in the CRSP database with sufficient data 
for OLS model estimation (e.g., 74 of the 123 investigated firms have monthly returns data available on 
CRSP and operate in an industry with at least five other firms). See footnotes 5, 8, 12, and 13 for further 
discussion of sample size. Excluding investigated firms not settling their antitrust case, the results are 
similar to those presented in Table 3 (e.g., the DAC estimated coefficient for settling firms is 2.051, 
significant at .10). 
11 
Vuong (1989) provides a likelihood ratio test that allows selection of the model, which better explains 
variations in a dependent variable. See Dechow (1994) for additional discussion of this model selection 
technique. 
12 
Like Table 3, the total sample results presented in Table 4 pertain to all investigated firms appearing in the 
CRSP database with sufficient data for OLS model estimation. The sample size for each model is dictated 
by data availability. For further discussion of sample size, see footnotes 8, 10, and 13. 
13 
As in Tables 3 and 4, the sample size for the model estimation in Table 5 is dictated by data availability, 
where the total sample results pertain to all investigated firms appearing in the CRSP database. For further 
discussion of sample size, see footnotes 8, 10 and 12. 
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